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1 
2 
3 
4 ARGUMENTATION IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY DISPUTES: COMPETING 
5 
6 
7 VISIONS OF QUALITY AND EQUITY 
8 
9 What is a “good” school?  Who is a “good” teacher?  How can we ensure that all students 
10 
11 have access to both? Current educational policy debates revolve around these questions. How we 
13 
14 answer them matters for whether and how we can provide a quality education for all students.  In 
15 16 this article, we describe how policymakers and educators engage these questions as they argue 
17 
18 
19 about test-based accountability. Test-based accountability currently dominates educational policy 
20 21 and practice in the US, Australia and other industrialized nations (Van Zanten, 2008; Porter, 1995; 
22 
23 
24 Lingard, 2011). It focuses entire school systems on a small set of quantitative performance 
25 
26 indicators, most prominently standardized test scores in literacy, numeracy and sometimes science. 
27 
28 
29 State, national and international policymakers use these indicators to monitor schools, teachers 
30 
31 and students and negatively sanction those who perform below standards. 
32 
33 Whether the press for accountability can improve the quality of education for all students 
35 
36 depends, in part, on the quality of our debate about such policies.  The metrics and data that test- 
37 38 based  accountability makes  available  provide  information  that  might  support  new  ways  to 
39 
40 
41 understand and enact educational quality and equity. As they simplify and reduce complex 
42 
43 educational processes to numerical ratings and rankings, however, these metrics can also narrow 
44 
45 
46 debate and the kind of education we think is possible (Anagnostopoulos, Rutledge & Jacobsen, 
47 
48 2013). 
49 
50 In this article, we hope to help educators and other stakeholders better understand the 
52 
53 structure of current educational policy debates and engage more deliberatively in them.  We first 
54 55 draw on pragmatic sociology to describe the argumentation frameworks that people employ in 
56 
57 
58 public disputes about evaluation policies. We then explore how various stakeholders use these 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
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2 
3 4 frameworks to argue about two prominent test-based accountability policies, the Organization for 
5 
6 
7 Economic  Co-operation  and  Development’s  (OECD)  Program  for   International  Student 
8 
9 Assessment (PISA) and enhanced teacher evaluation. 
10 
11 Argumentation in Public Disputes 
13 
14 Pragmatic  sociology  examines  the  arguments  people  employ  to  justify  or  critique 
15 16 evaluative policies that raise questions about the quality of schools and teachers. As people engage 
17 
18 
19 in disputes about these policies, they evoke different “orders of worth,” or higher order principles, 
20 21 to build arguments about the policies’ legitimacy and fairness.   We have found Boltanski and 
22 
23 
24 Thevenot’s (1999) work helpful in understanding these arguments. Boltanski and Thevenot (1999) 
25 
26 identify orders of worth commonly employed in public disputes about evaluative policies: civic, 
27 
28 
29 market, industrial, domestic, inspired, and fame.  Each emphasizes a distinct mode of worth, test 
30 
31 of worthiness, type of evidence, and valued human qualifications or qualities. Table 1 summarizes 
32 
33 the orders of worth. 
35 
36 INSERT TABLE ONE HERE 
37 38 Orders of worth are argumentation kits (Jacquemain, 2008).  They provide the grammars 
39 
40 
41 for justifying and critiquing policies about school and teacher quality and how it should be 
42 
43 evaluated. We highlight the industrial and civic orders here as we have found them to dominate 
44 
45 
46 current policy disputes about test-based accountability policies. The industrial order values 
47 
48 technical  efficiency. Industrial  arguments  define  school  and  teacher  quality  as  technical 
49 
50 effectiveness.  Tests of worth assess teachers’ competence and reliability.  Evidence considered 
52 
53 valid must be measurable and includes data and statistics that compare school and teacher 
54 55 performance to standardized metrics. The civic order, in contrast, values the collective over 
56 
57 
58 individual welfare and emphasizes law, rights, and issues of equity. Tests of worth assess equality 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
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3 4 and solidarity. Quality schools and teachers therefore adhere to official rules and laws and seek to 
5 
6 
7 serve the collective good. 
8 
9 In modern democracies, orders of worth co-exist.  Individuals and groups who mobilize 
10 
11 multiple orders of worth garner legitimacy for their arguments and their actions (Jagd, 2011). The 
13 
14 extent to which policymakers and educators, in particular, can balance multiple orders of worth in 
15 16 disputes about test-based accountability matters for their ability to withstand public scrutiny, not 
17 
18 
19 only of their arguments about these policies, but also of their work and their authority over it 
20 21 (Patriotta, Gond & Schultz, 2011). In the following, we describe arguments surrounding the PISA 
22 
23 
24 and enhanced teacher evaluation, attending to the orders of worth various stakeholders mobilize 
25 
26 and how they grapple with questions of educational quality and equity. 
27 
28 
29 Justifying PISA 
30 
31 Promoters of the PISA primarily evoke industrial and market orders to justify international 
32 
33 assessments as valid tests of the worth of national educational systems. As we show, this argument 
35 
36 rests on correlating quality and equity and on re-articulating the latter into the logic of testing. 
37 38 International large scale assessments can be traced back to the late 1950s and the attempt, by 
39 
40 
41 academics, to measure educational outcomes across national systems. This history culminated in 
42 
43 the  creation  of  TIMSS  and  PIRLS  by  the  International  Association  for  the  Evaluation  of 
44 
45 
46 Educational Achievement, PISA by the OECD (first administered in 2000), and other lesser known 
47 
48 assessments. Due to its policy focus and the involvement of many powerful industrialized nations, 
49 
50 PISA is the most influential of these assessments.  It tests 15 year olds on measures of reading, 
52 
53 numerical and scientific literacies and extends beyond the 34 OECD members. Sixty-five nations 
54 55 participated in 2012, and more again in 2015.  Every three years, newspapers around the world 
56 
57 
58 carry headlines describing the comparative success or failure of national education systems on 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
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3 4 PISA. The OECD assiduously choreographs this global media release of PISA results, enabling 
5 
6 
7 national media to create global league tables of national system performance. The extensive global 
8 
9 media coverage has produced ‘PISA shocks’ (e.g. Germany 2001, Japan, 2006) where PISA results 
10 
11 contradict national expectations and educational performance is framed as of national importance 
13 
14 (Martens & Niemans, 2013). 
15 16 The graph in Figure 1 is one of the most common visualizations of PISA data.  Quality, 
17 
18 
19 represented on the Y axis, is the average performance on that portion of the focal test of each 
20 21 round, e.g., reading, math or science.  Equity, represented on the X axis, is the extent to which 
22 
23 
24 social background correlates with this performance (e.g. weaker correlation equals greater equity). 
25 
26 INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
27 
28 
29 As the graph suggests, the OECD (2007) argues that quality and equity are complementary. 
30 
31 However in its choreographed release of PISA performance data, the OECD emphasizes league 
32 
33 tables of national performance on the quality measure. These tables get an enormous amount of 
35 
36 media coverage, focusing debate on the achievement measure. The OECD does release a very 
37 38 extensive report on equity and PISA. It does so, however, quite some time after the initial release 
39 
40 
41 of PISA ‘results’ and with much less fanfare. The equity data do not get the extensive media 
42 
43 coverage that the quality indicators garner. In its education work, the OECD also prioritizes 
44 
45 
46 policies  that  address  organizational  factors  while  eschewing  consideration  of  structural 
47 
48 inequalities. 
49 
50 While PISA allows for considerations of equity, it thus rearticulates them within the 
52 
53 industrial and market orders of worth. Equity measures fundamentally draw on the civic order with 
54 55 its  emphases  on  rights,  equality  and  the  collective  good. Yet,  the  OECD’s  emphasis  on 
56 
57 
58 achievement measures in its reports and release of PISA data gives preeminence to the industrial 
59 
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3 4 order  with  its  focus  on  standardized  measures  of  performance  and  productivity. As  an 
5 
6 
7 intergovernmental organization concerned with economic policy, the OECD also argues that 
8 
9 equity matters because of its benefits to national and global economies, illustrated by its 2012 
10 
11 report, “Investing in Equity in Education Pays Off” (Lingard, Sellar, & Savage, 2014). The worth 
13 
14 of national educational systems is determined by how well their students’ performance on the 
15 16 relevant standardized achievement tests ranks against the performance of other nations’ students. 
17 
18 
19 This performance matters as it contributes to a nation’s human capital. Broader and more fulsome 
20 21 constructions of equity as equal opportunity and social equality in respect to schooling policy and 
22 
23 
24 practices are elided or recast according to their relation to productivity and efficiency. 
25 
26 The re-articulation of equity into the logic of testing exemplifies how data furnish the basis 
27 
28 
29 for argumentation in policy development, serving a rhetorical function and demanding debate 
30 
31 about whether such data actually do constitute evidence. OECD reports mobilize PISA data 
32 
33 rhetorically to argue for increasing equity and democracy, while simultaneously framing the data 
35 
36 within the industrial and market orders.  The focus on improving achievement scores will, OECD 
37 38 reports suggest, increase the quality and quantity of “human capital” within a given nation and 
39 
40 
41 thus enhance “economic productivity” and “international competitiveness” (Lingard, Sellar, & 
42 
43 Savage, 2014). Equity and social inclusion are valued as contributing factors in enhancing 
44 
45 
46 economic productivity and efficiency. 
47 
48 If we wish to argue with or against PISA data for equity and the democratic purposes of 
49 
50 schooling, we must attend to the relationships between data, fact, evidence and values. Here we 
52 
53 follow Rosenberg’s (2013) useful distinction: ‘facts are ontological, evidence is epistemological, 
54 55 data are rhetorical…. When a fact is proven false, it ceases to be a fact. False data is data 
56 
57 
58 nonetheless’ (p.18). OECD arguments for increasing equity as a correlate to increased productivity 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
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3 4 and efficiency mobilizes testing as fact and evidence in relation to market and industrial values. 
5 
6 
7 Mobilizing counter-arguments that PISA data can also constrict our understanding of the purposes 
8 
9 and outcomes of schooling to numbers will require evoking other orders of worth and reassessing 
10 
11 the ontological and epistemological status of data according to their justificatory frameworks. For 
13 
14 example, test data may provide a useful basis for factual claims about the relationship between test 
15 16 performance and productivity, but their status as facts may be challenged by questions of testing 
17 
18 
19 bias that evoke the civic order.   Similarly, arguments that challenge the use of PISA data as 
20 21 evidence that narrowly focuses educational policy on academic literacies could be launched from 
22 
23 
24 the civic, domestic or inspired orders which value education for citizenship, social cohesion, and 
25 
26 creativity, respectively. 
27 
28 
29 Arguing about Enhanced Teacher Evaluation 
30 
31 In this section, we examine the debate surrounding enhanced teacher evaluation policies in 
32 
33 the US, focusing on Washington DC Public School’s (DCPS) IMPACT policy. If PISA represents 
35 
36 the global reach of test-based accountability, IMPACT represents its reach into schools’ core – 
37 38 teaching and learning. Adopted in 2009, IMPACT quickly became a national model. IMPACT is 
39 
40 
41 a system of metrics, classifications, and compensation structures.   It categorizes teachers into 
42 
43 different groups (1 through 4), based on availability of student testing data, subjects taught, and 
44 
45 
46 specialization areas.  Teachers in each group are rated according to their students’ achievement 
47 
48 and their instructional expertise, community contributions and professionalism. Most general 
49 
50 education classroom teachers fall into Groups 1 and 2. In 2014-2015, ratings for teachers in Group 
52 
53 1 comprised 35% value-added measures of individual teachers’ contributions to their students’ 
54 55 scores on standardized mathematics and reading achievement tests (IVA) and 15% teacher- 
56 
57 
58 assessed student achievement data (TAS); 40% instructional expertise measured by teachers’ 
59 
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3 4 average scores on multiple classroom observations conducted by school principals and district- 
5 
6 
7 appointed evaluators using the district’s Teaching and Learning Framework rubric (TLF); 10% 
8 
9 Commitment to the School Community (CSC). Group 1 constitutes roughly 15% of DCPS 
10 
11 teachers. In 2014-2015, Group 2 teachers’ ratings comprised: 75% TLF; 15% TAS, and 10% CSC. 
13 
14 Group 2 includes approximately 65% of DCPS teachers.  For all groups, Core Professionalism is 
15 16 determined by attendance, adherence to policies and procedures, and respectfulness.  The district 
17 
18 
19 ties teachers’ composite ratings to its performance-pay compensation system, IMPACTplus, and 
20 21 career ladder, LIFT. Teachers rated “ineffective” can be fired. Those rated “highly effective” can 
22 
23 
24 earn significant annual bonuses and salary increases, depending on their LIFT classification 
25 
26 (DCPS, 2014a, 2014b). 
27 
28 
29 Though monetary rewards evoke the market order, IMPACT rests on industrial principles, 
30 
31 methods and evidentiary practices.  It determines teachers’ worth based on their productivity and 
32 
33 competence; teachers who produce the highest gains in test scores and whose practice most closely 
35 
36 aligns with district standards receive the highest ratings.   IMPACT uses an array of statistical 
37 38 models and standardized tools and processes to collect evidence of teachers’ effectiveness.  The 
39 
40 
41 differentiation of teachers into IMPACT performance categories and LIFT expertise categories 
42 
43 further exemplifies the industrial order’s use of elaborate classification schemes to rank teachers’ 
44 
45 
46 worth against their peers’. 
47 
48 Justifying IMPACT 
49 
50 Not surprisingly, proponents overwhelmingly employ industrial arguments that marshal 
52 
53 various statistics to defend IMPACT’s implementation and effectiveness. District officials justify 
54 55 IMPACT by repeatedly citing the discrepancy between low student achievement scores (12% of 
56 
57 
58 8th graders at proficiency on national test) and high teacher evaluation ratings (98% teachers rated 
59 
60 
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3 4 satisfactory) documented prior to IMPACT (e.g., DCPS, 2014; Education Trust & TNTP, 2014). 
5 
6 
7 DPCS officials and other proponents also frequently cite statistics from research on IMPACT’s 
8 
9 effects on teacher attrition and performance (e.g., DCPS, 2013; TNTP, 2013).  The widespread 
10 
11 circulation of these numbers reflects and strengthens their rhetorical force. The district’s reports 
13 
14 of teacher firings at the end of the policy’s first year are illustrative. In 2010, the district reported 
15 16 that it fired 241 “ineffective” teachers (Turque, 2010a). Though it was later revealed that only 75 
17 
18 
19 of these teachers had been dismissed because of “ineffective” IMPACT ratings (Turque, 2010b), 
20 21 the original number had garnered considerable press and been repeated in feature stories, blogs 
22 
23 
24 and editorials in local and national news media and electronic forums (e.g., Holland, 2010; DeVore 
25 
26 & Cheers, 2010). The corrected number received little media coverage. While the number “241” 
27 
28 
29 had lost its ontological status as “fact,” it retained its historical status as “data” in the public debate, 
30 
31 highlighting   the   rhetorical   force   of   industrial   arguments   in   disputes   about   test-based 
32 
33 accountability. 
35 
36 Importantly,  proponents  also  mobilize  civic  arguments  to  justify  IMPACT. Then- 
37 38 Chancellor Rhee, for example, heralded the 241 teacher firings as fulfilling the “rights” of DCPS 
39 
40 
41 children, “Every child in a District of Columbia public school has a right to a highly effective 
42 
43 teacher… Today…we take another step toward making that commitment a reality” (Turque, 
44 
45 
46 2010a).  In the 2009-2010 IMPACT guidebooks, Rhee similarly wrote: 
47 
48 …we are motivated by a commitment to ensure that the gap in achievement that separates 
49 
50 District of Columbia children by race, class, language of origin, and special education 
52 
53 status is eliminated once and for all. Research and experience tell us that the most 
54 55 important factor impacting our ability to close the achievement gap and increase student 
56 
57 
58 learning is you: the adults who serve our students each and every day.  Recognizing the 
59 
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3 4 unparalleled importance of ensuring that talented and committed individuals are serving 
5 
6 
7 our students, we have developed IMPACT, the new DCPS effectiveness assessment system 
8 
9 for school-based personnel (DCPS, 2009, p. 3). 
10 
11 The statement positions IMPACT as the primary means for achieving equality as defined by the 
13 
14 elimination of various achievement gaps.  While the Chancellor acknowledges teachers’ potential 
15 16 contribution to closing these gaps, a collective goal, she emphasizes the “effectiveness” of 
17 
18 
19 “individual” teachers, not their collective action. Similar to PISA arguments, pro-IMPACT 
20 21 arguments  rearticulate  civic  values  of  equity  and  collective  action  as  individual  teachers’ 
22 
23 
24 efficiency measured by student achievement tests. 
25 
26 Critiquing IMPACT 
27 
28 
29 Critics use different orders of worth to critique IMPACT.  Researchers typically employ 
30 
31 industrial arguments to question the district’s calculation of value-added measures and mechanistic 
32 
33 implementation of classroom observations (e.g. Pallas, 2010; Curtis, 2011).  These critiques aim 
35 
36 to improve the policy not challenge its conception of quality. Teachers critique IMPACT 
37 38 implementation with civic arguments that question its fairness. In blogs and editorials in DC 
39 
40 
41 newspapers, teachers denounce the district’s differential use of IVA and TLF scores among DCPS 
42 
43 teachers as “inequitable expectations” (e.g., Perschke, 2011).  They also highlight the disparity 
44 
45 
46 between the high percentage (40%) of teachers rated “highly effective” in the district’s few low- 
47 
48 poverty schools versus the low percentage (15%) of teachers rated “highly effective’ in high- 
49 
50 poverty schools (e,g., Cintron, 2014). Importantly, though the vast majority of DCPS students live 
52 
53 in  poverty,  teachers’  civic  critiques  do  not  extend  to  broader  questions  of  socio-economic 
54 55 inequality.  Their arguments narrowly define equity as fairness for teachers. 
56 
57 
58 
59 
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3 4 Teachers also critique IMPACT using domestic arguments. These arguments often appear 
5 
6 
7 in “open letters” to the DCPS Chancellor written by teachers and circulated by bloggers and 
8 
9 newspaper columnists (e.g., Perschke, 2011; Fuchs, 2011).  In these letters, teachers contest the 
10 
11 TLF ratings assigned by district-appointed Master Educators (MEs).  Teachers denounce the ME 
13 
14 ratings, based on one hour of observations per year per teacher, as incapable of capturing the 
15 16 complexity of their work and their relationships with students. Teachers enumerate the extra hours 
17 
18 
19 they devote to teaching and school-wide duties and document their pastoral care of students as 
20 21 evidence of their worth.  As one teacher argues, the ME ratings fail to capture the value of her 
22 
23 
24 work as “a mother, best friend, sister, guidance counselor, mentor and teacher” to her students 
25 
26 (abcde, 2011). Teachers’ domestic critiques thus counter IMPACT’s definition of quality teaching 
27 
28 
29 as “effectiveness” by defining quality teaching as familial-caring whose quality is evidenced not 
30 
31 by numerical ratings derived from systematic observations, but by personal anecdotes. 
32 
33 Implications and Conclusion 
35 
36 As our research suggests, current debate about test-based accountability is dominated by 
37 38 industrial arguments.  This partly reflects the rhetorical force of the measures and metrics of test- 
39 
40 
41 based  accountability. These  measures  radically simplify and  reduce  complex  processes  of 
42 
43 teaching, learning and schooling into numbers, ratings and leagues tables that can circulate across 
44 
45 
46 local, national and international contexts and media. Even when shown to be false, these numbers 
47 
48 profoundly shape educational policy debate, defining both quality and equity as efficiency and 
49 
50 productivity as evidenced primarily by standardized test scores. Concerns about broader structures 
52 
53 and impacts of poverty and social exclusion on students’ lives, life chances, and educational 
54 55 attainment go largely unmentioned. 
56 
57 
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3 4 If debate about test-based accountability is to support a more expansive vision of equitable 
5 
6 
7 education, critiques of these policies must evoke principles of the common good that extend 
8 
9 beyond teaching and schooling and that connect to the well-being and rights of students. Such 
10 
11 critiques will require arguing with numbers.  Numbers and statistics make visible inequities in 
13 
14 educational opportunities and in the social and economic conditions that profoundly interact with 
15 16 them. As Piketty in his analysis of growing levels of inequality suggests,  ‘Refusing to deal with 
17 
18 
19 numbers rarely serves the interests of the least well-off’ (2014, p. 577).  Arguments that seek to 
20 21 counter the narrow vision of test-based accountability need to rearticulate these numbers through 
22 
23 
24 civic arguments which emphasize collective responsibility for educational equity that extends 
25 
26 beyond teachers and schools to include policymakers and those stakeholders with access to 
27 
28 
29 resources and power.  While educators must counter policies that are unfair to them, they must 
30 
31 also mobilize broader principles of the common good to garner legitimacy for their arguments and 
32 
33 their work. 
35 
36 Arguing for a more expansive vision of educational quality and equity will also require 
37 38 finding new genres and media outlets.  Proponents of test-based accountability use metrics and 
39 
40 
41 numbers to justify and legitimate these policies.  Critics of test-based accountability more often 
42 
43 rely on personal anecdotes of their work, relationships with students, and dispositions.   Such 
44 
45 
46 evidence cannot be easily verified or circulated beyond local classroom and school contexts. 
47 
48 Efforts to oppose or improve test-based accountability will depend partly, however, on marshalling 
49 
50 this evidence in ways that enable both. This includes developing relationships with journalists, 
52 
53 reporters and activists who can circulate this evidence.   Notably, local media and bloggers in 
54 55 Washington D.C. did take up teachers’ “open letters to the Chancellor,” illustrating the rhetorical 
56 
57 
58 potential of the evidence and these relationships. 
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12 
2 
3 4 At a moment in which more narrowly defined tests of school, teacher and students’ worth 
5 
6 
7 proliferate, educators and proponents of democratic education must find ways to rearticulate ideas 
8 
9 of effectiveness and achievement as access for all students to competent and caring teachers and 
10 
11 to  learning  opportunities  that  engage  students’  academic,  moral,  and  civic  capacities  and 
13 
14 imaginations.  In the end, we argue for creating and valuing “heterarchies of worth” (Lamont, 
15 16 2012), or the co-existence of multiple conceptions of good teaching and good schools and of 
17 
18 
19 multiple ways to assess them.  Establishing such heterarchies will require creating new ways of 
20 21 documenting and arguing for such diverse conceptions. It will also mean that public disputes 
22 
23 
24 about educational policy will never be fully resolved as each order of worth contains conflicting 
25 
26 justificatory principles. Such disputes when engaged in by the widest range of stakeholders are, 
27 
28 
29 however, essential to democratic society and to achieving “good” and “just” schools. 
30 
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41 
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Figure 1. PISA Student Performance and Equity Table 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2013, p. 27 
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Table 1. Orders of Worth 
 
Order Industrial Civic Market Domestic Inspired Fame 
Basis of 
evaluation or 
worth 
Technical 
efficiency 
Collective 
welfare 
Price Esteem, 
reputation 
Grace, 
creativeness, 
nonconformity 
Renown, 
fame 
Test Competence, 
reliability 
Equality, 
solidarity 
Market 
Competitiveness 
Trustworthiness Passion Popularity 
Evidence Measureable 
statistics, 
standards 
Formal 
rules, 
official 
regulations, 
laws, rights 
Money Anecdote, case, 
example, 
personally 
warranted 
Emotional 
involvement 
& expression 
Semiotic 
Valued 
Human 
Qualification 
Professional 
competency, 
expertise 
Equality Desire, 
purchasing 
power 
Authority, 
tradition 
Creativity, 
ingenuity 
Celebrity 
 
 
Source: Boltanski & Thevenot, 1999b; Patriotta, et al, 2011 
